ACLED Regional Overview Africa: December 2022
SOURCE: ACLED
Regional Overview
Africa: December 2022
Posted: 13 January 2023
Somali military forces (SNA) and allied militias took control over several strategic al-Shabaab strongholds in December, including some controlled by the group since 2016, as part of a sustained government offensive against al-Shabaab since September. These takeovers were highest in the Middle Shabelle, where the military claimed to have reportedly killed around 150 al-Shabaab militants. Despite a drop since September, territorial exchange events in December remained over 60% higher than the 2022 monthly average.
In southeastern Somaliland, demonstrations against the administration of Muse Buhi Abdi escalated into multiple instances of fighting with security forces in late December. The clashes reportedly left at least 20 demonstrators dead in Laascaanood town, the capital of the Sool region. People gathered in the streets to accuse the government of assassinating Abdifatah Abdulli Hadrawi, an opposition party member of the Somaliland National Party, also known as the Wadani National Party. Demonstrators demanded that the Somaliland administration cede control of the town, which is the site of a border dispute between Somaliland and neighboring Puntland, to the Puntland government. These demonstrations drove the most monthly demonstrations in the Sool region since August 2016 and contributed to the second-highest number of monthly demonstrations in all of Somaliland in 2022. The Somaliland administration also faced pressure from opposition parties calling for presidential polls after the postponement of elections scheduled for November 2022 to 2024.1
DRC: Rising tensions with Rwanda and continued fighting with M23
Ongoing fighting between Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the M23 continued to intensify tensions with Rwanda. On 23 December, the March 23rd Movement (M23) announced a withdrawal from positions in Nyiragongo territory, Nord-Kivu province, and allegedly transferred territory to the regional force of the East African Community. However, IDPs attempting to return reported that the M23 was still occupying positions within the buffer zone, triggering reluctance to leave the camps.2 The FARDC dubbed the handover a “sham” and claimed that instead of withdrawing, the group was strengthening positions.3Militias such as the Nyatura, Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo, and Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda also intensified their armed struggle against M23, both independently and sometimes alongside FARDC. ACLED records at least 52 political violence events involving the M23 in December, resulting in at least 33 reported fatalities. A growing number of countries and watch groups have condemned Rwanda’s support of the M23, including a recent UN expert report providing additional evidence of the Rwandan military backing.4
Tensions with Rwanda further escalated when the Rwandan navy shelled a Congolese military plane that crossed into Rwandan airspace on 28 December. The aircraft returned to DRC undamaged. Further, the Congolese government alleged that journalists working for the Rwandan government and staying in M23 occupied zones illegally entered the country to misinform the population about the Kishishe mass killings.5 Additionally, DRC military forces arrested four civilians in Kinshasa on 28 December, including a Rwandan civilian and another Rwandan military officer, over suspicion of espionage.6 According to DRC authorities, the group was using a non-profit organization to buy properties near Kibomango military base and N’djili airport to plan an attack against the Congolese president.7
Sahel: Violence against civilians during operations against Islamist armed groups
Political violence in Burkina Faso continued amidst Islamist militants’ attacks against civilians and armed confrontations with government forces. Burkinabe troops conducted a significant operation that led them to successfully recapture over six villages from Jamaa Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) in Banwa province of the Boucle du Mouhoun region. The operation started with artillery strikes and air-supported ground operations in early December in Solenzo and Sanaba departments. By 7 December, troops had destroyed 11 JNIM bases and reportedly killed 30 militants in the two departments, leaving space to recapture numerous other villages in the following days. These operations led to the highest number of reported territorial exchange events in Burkina Faso in 2022.
Amid the government offensives, supported by local armed groups, state forces have also engaged in a growing trend of targeting members of the Fulani community on suspicion of collaborating with Islamist militants. Government and allied militias conducted a series of summary executions in December, reportedly killing 28 Fulani community members. In December, the government and allied militias reportedly killed more civilians than the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) and JNIM combined.
In Mali, the majority of violent events in December were between JNIM and IS Sahel in the Gao region, as well as government forces and Wagner group anti-Islamist operations across the Gao, Mopti, Segou, Sikasso, and Menaka regions. Although clashes between JNIM and IS Sahel decreased in December compared to November, JNIM militants targeted civilians perceived as loyal to IS Sahel in a wave of deadly attacks in Anchwadi and Talataye communes, Gao region.
Sudan: New political framework for a government transitional period
Following months of large-scale demonstrations against military rule, calling for elections, and demanding a civilian government, a political framework agreement was signed between the Transitional Military Council and a group of political parties led by the Forces of Freedom and Change – Central Council on 5 December. The agreement proposes the establishment of a transitional period for a civilian-led government at all levels and the continuation of the Juba peace agreement’s implementation.8 Several opposition political groups opposed the agreements, most notably Resistance Committees.9 Demonstrations against the coup and the transition agreement continued during the signing process and the following days, resulting in scores of injuries when security forces violently intervened to disperse the gatherings. Demonstrations grew throughout 2021 and peaked in January 2022. While the total number of demonstrations was higher in December than the previous month, the number of monthly demonstrations has declined since January.
Nigeria: Ongoing election-related violence ahead of February polls
Election-related violent events continued in December in Nigeria, two months before the February 2023 general elections. Violence targeted leaders, supporters of political parties, and election offices, including two Local Government Area (LGA) offices of the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) in Oru West and Isu, Imo State. In Afikpo South LGA of Ebonyi state, two rival factions of the All Progressives Congress (APC) ruling party engaged in a deadly supremacy clash resulting in three reported fatalities. APC supporters also targeted other political party supporters and were accused of involvement in the assassination of the Oyo City Peoples Democratic Party chieftain in Oyo state on 28 December. Nigeria’s Independent Electoral Commission has raised concerns that these incidents of electoral violence could endanger the regular conduct of elections, and that strategic violence could be used closer to the election day to suppress voter turnout in key electoral battlegrounds.10
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