| | |  | | GEOPOLITICAL DIGEST | | JULY 29, 2022 | | | | CURATED BY | |  |
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The Week Ahead:Pelosi's Asia Trip Begins. US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi will leave on a tour of Asia on 29 July, with stops in Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia. She has yet to confirm whether she will visit Taiwan, a stop that could prompt diplomatic tensions between China and the United States, and even a military show of force. Beijing has announced three military exercises in the South China Sea in the coming days, including one 240 kilometers (about 150 miles) from Taiwan's Pratas Island, while a US aircraft carrier group has moved from Singapore to the South China Sea. Pelosi's decision to visit and China's potential response to it (e.g., imposing a no-fly zone over Taiwan) could change the status quo for US-China military deterrence regarding Taiwan, which could make surprise political crises like Pelosi's potential visit more common. The First Shipment Under the Russia-Ukraine Grain Deal. Grain shipments will likely commence next week, according to the office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who on 29 July at the port of Chornomorsk attended the loading of the first ship set to export grain from a Ukrainian Black Sea port under the Russia-Ukraine deal struck on 22 July. Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine is now entirely ready to begin exports, and said they would start in the coming days. Initial shipments to demonstrate the deal's viability are likely, although uncertainty on key details, including those related to insurance and the exact coordinates of the shipping routes, will likely prevent the ramping-up of shipments for a few more weeks. Senegalese Legislative Elections. Senegal's main opposition coalition, Yewwi Askan Wi, on 31 July will vie for a legislative majority against President Macky Sall's ruling party. Tensions have intensified in Senegal since the country's Constitutional Council banned a list of opposition candidates from participating in the election, resulting in violence between protesters and police in mid-June that saw three people killed. This round of polling is particularly charged, as opposition groups have warned that a renewed legislative majority for the ruling party would likely lead to support for Sall's anticipated bid for an unconstitutional third term in 2025. Erdogan Meets Putin in Sochi. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 5 August will visit Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia, part of Turkey's balancing act between its allies in the West and Russia. The pair will likely discuss the grain deal to bring Black Sea wheat back onto the world market, possible future Russian investments in Turkey and perhaps the sale of Turkish drones to Russia, which Moscow has expressed interest in after their combat performance in Syria, Libya and Ukraine against Russian or Russian-backed forces. They will also likely discuss Syria, where Russian forces still act as a blocking force to a Turkish operation in the north of the country against Kurdish militants. Erdogan did not receive greenlight for such an operation during a trilateral summit with Putin and Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Tehran earlier this July. With no Iranian delegation at Sochi and Tehran more opposed to greater Turkish control of Syria than Russia, Erdogan might press Putin more directly to allow another Turkish operation in Syria. Please read on for our coverage of the week that was... | |
| | | KEY DEVELOPMENTS - ANALYSIS |
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Chinese Overseas Tibetan Dragnet Poses Xinjiang-Style Reputational Risks to Companies |
| | What Happened: Chinese authorities have been attempting to lure Tibetans overseas (e.g., in Nepal or India) to return to Tibet by bribing them, inquiring about their return plans and foreign activities, and interrogating their families in Tibet, Radio Free Asia reported on 26 July. RFA quoted Tibetans who said that upon returning to Tibet, they were interrogated by the police, had their cellphones regularly inspected, and had their movement restricted around sensitive calendar dates. Why It Matters: As US-China relations deteriorate further, this Chinese dragnet targeting overseas Tibetans could escalate into more Xinjiang-style social restrictions, potentially prompting Western media outrage and sanctions. This could, in turn, trigger Western manufacturing flight from Tibet as well as from the more economically important Sichuan and Qinghai provinces, where Tibetans tend to live and work. China's forced assimilation campaigns are common in most of its ethnic minority-dominated regions, so similar reputational risks could arise in areas other than Tibet and Xinjiang. | | | |
Voters Approve Tunisian Constitution, Country's Economic Future Remains Uncertain |
| | What Happened: Tunisian referendum voters on 25 July approved a draft constitution reverting Tunisia's government to a more centralized, presidential system, rather than the parliamentary system instituted by the country's post-Arab Spring 2014 constitution. Opposition parties boycotted the referendum; the low turnout suggests many voters joined the boycott or were too indifferent to go to the polls. Why It Matters: Civil society groups fear Tunisian President Kais Saied could use his greater control over nearly every government function to undermine political and media freedoms, though he might use his stronger powers to force through reforms that could boost Tunisia's struggling economy. Saied has expressed support for reforms that would unlock a $4 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. Reforming the economy will, however, encounter strong opposition from the powerful UGTT labor union, which rejects reductions in wages, subsidies or other benefits for Tunisians. | | | |
Assessments: The CHIPS Act Won’t Reduce the US’s Strategic Reliance on the Global Semiconductor Sector |
| | On 27 July, lawmakers in the US Senate passed the $280 billion the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act, which subsidizes US-made semiconductor chips and boosts investments in cutting-edge science and technology initiatives. The passage of the bill in Congress comes after more than a year of legislative debate and dialogue with US business leaders on how to support the semiconductor industry in the wake of the disruptive global chip shortage and the growing competition with China. Proposals that were ultimately left out of the final version of the bill also highlight that Congress may not have enough support for more aggressive measures to slow the advancement of China’s semiconductor industry, as well as deter US (and Western) companies from investing in strategic industries in China. If signed into law by Biden (as expected), the CHIPS Act portion of the bill will increase domestic semiconductor manufacturing. But this is unlikely to significantly reduce the United States’ overall reliance on the global semiconductor industry. | | | |
On Geopolitics: Will the Saudi Crown Prince Risk the Monarchy’s Mystique for Israeli Normalization? |
| | For now, Saudi-Israeli normalization looks sure to remain slow under King Salman. But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (commonly known as MbS) will eventually ascend to the throne once his 86-year-old father dies. And when he does, MbS’s characteristic brash approach to geopolitics could see Saudi Arabia normalize ties with Israel sooner rather than later. With such assumptions, MbS could thus readily conclude that the much-feared public blowback to Saudi-Israeli normalization may never manifest. After all, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco recently normalized their ties with Israel without major pushback, and each of those countries has either more vibrant opposition groups, weaker social contracts, and/or poorer security environments than those which exist in Saudi Arabia. In such a scenario, some Saudis might decide that the MbS-led monarchy no longer rules in their interest, and demand adjustments to the political system — either by empowering moribund institutions like the king-appointed Allegiance Council or the rubber-stamp legislative Shura Council or by inventing new institutions that might better represent them (akin to the United Arab Emirates popularly-elected though still-consultive Federal National Council). | | | |
Essential Geopolitics: What You Should Know About Brazil's Presidential Election |
| | In this episode of RANE's Essential Geopolitics podcast, Latin America analyst Carmen Colosi walks us through Brazil's upcoming October presidential election. This year, former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is challenging current President Jair Bolsonaro, whose critique of Brazil's electoral institutions could contribute to ongoing misinformation campaigns and potential allegations of election fraud. Please click on the RANE Worldview link below to access the podcast. | | | |
| | | OTHER STORIES WE'RE TRACKING - CURATED CONTENT |
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What to Expect From a Bolder Xi Jinping |
| | Get Ready for a More Ambitious Chinese Foreign Policy. As China prepares for this fall’s 20th Party Congress, the odds grow stronger by the day that Chinese President Xi Jinping will emerge from the meeting having secured a third term in office. Xi's personality and political beliefs leave little room for a reconsideration, let alone a reversal, of his vision for the country. Once the Party Congress is behind him, Xi will seek to reassert Chinese power in areas of strategic priority. Disputes in the western Pacific will be at the top of his list. Tensions are already building around the Korean Peninsula, with North Korea’s next provocation only a matter of time and Washington and Seoul intent on enhancing their deterrence against Pyongyang. | | | |
For Hong Kong’s Beijing-Backed Officials, Xi’s All That |
| | On his first full day on the job, Hong Kong’s new leader, John Lee, shared a picture of himself working at his desk with a printout of what he described as an important speech by Xi Jinping placed next to his notebook. In mainland China, such displays of devotion to the country’s powerful leader are common. But they represent a jarring shift for Hong Kong, a former British colony. While Hong Kong has long had to abide by Beijing’s decisions over major issues, the bureaucracy’s conspicuous embrace of Mr. Xi has crystallized the city’s new identity as a territory firmly in Beijing’s grip. | | | |
The Taliban’s Neighbors Fear Afghanistan’s ‘Boiling Pot’ of Terrorism |
| | Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states were united in support of the Taliban’s victory over the former government last August, as they were happy to see the United States leave the region. Now that they’ve got the Taliban on their hands, few appear to know how to halt their brutality and transform them from murderous drug-dealing thieves into politicians. The resurgence of terrorism in Afghanistan is also giving its neighbors fits. | | | |
Ukraine Could Be Turning the Tide of War Again as Russian Advances Stall |
| | Russian advances in Ukraine have slowed almost to a standstill as newly delivered Western weapons help Ukrainian forces reclaim much of the advantage they had lost in recent months, opening a window of opportunity to turn the tide of the war in their favor again. Western officials and analysts suspect that the Russians are close to exhausting their capacity to make further territorial gains as their depleted army confronts Ukrainian forces with newly acquired capabilities. | | | |
Germany Is Caught in Putin’s Trap |
| | A collective sigh of relief went through Berlin this week as Russia resumed its gas deliveries through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline after a scheduled ten-day maintenance break. But even with the immediate crisis averted, Germany remains palpably jittery: it is unclear whether it will have enough gas to get through the winter. Putin has been keen to highlight the vulnerability that Germany’s dependence on Russian gas, oil and coal has created. Alarmingly, German politicians are doing very little to hide their own panic over the matter. | | | |
Pegasus Surveillance Plagues Democratic Europe |
| | A year after the Pegasus scandal broke, the use of Israeli spyware by some of Europe’s democratic governments continues to raise alarms. Although the US has blacklisted Pegasus, Europe looks unlikely to support a ban. Until now, rules around spyware remain a national competency, with the EU having almost no say over national security matters. It remains unclear which countries are using spyware, on whom exactly and for what motives. | | | |
On US Foreign Policy, the New Boss Acts a Lot Like the Old One |
| | The Biden administration has charted the same course as the Trump administration on strategic priorities like China, the Middle East, and US military deployments. Mr. Biden has denounced autocracies, promoted the importance of democracy and called for global cooperation on issues that include climate change and the coronavirus pandemic. But in critical areas, the Biden administration has not made substantial breaks, showing how difficult it is in Washington to chart new courses on foreign policy. | | | |
In Argentina, a Mysterious Plane |
| | In June, Argentina’s political and media establishment took a break from its usual preoccupation – the country’s ever worsening political and economic crisis – and focused on a different plotline, the mysterious story of a Venezuelan cargo aircraft detained at Buenos Aires’s main airport. Beyond its cinematic character, this episode raised serious issues both about the extent of Venezuela’s connection with Iran and about Argentina’s continuing vulnerabilities nearly three decades after Iran-backed terrorists bombed a Jewish community center in the Argentine capital. | | | |
How the Cyberwar Between Iran and Israel Has Intensified |
| | Iran and Israel have long engaged in mutual offensive covert cyber-actions, although neither government took credit for them in public. More than a decade ago, Iranian officials discovered the Stuxnet malware in the uranium enrichment centrifuges in one of Iran’s nuclear facilities, marking the first public evidence of the use of cyberweapons against Iran. But the alleged cyberattacks and intrusions between Iran and Israel have intensified, gaining global attention and coverage, giving a new public dimension to the ongoing covert conflict. | | | |
Macron Tries To Push Back Against Russia Influence in Africa |
| | French President Emmanuel Macron is ready to step up support to African countries facing food and security concerns in a bid to stem Russia’s growing sway in the region. Macron has pledged to revamp France’s military commitment to African security even as French soldiers leave Mali, pushed out by the junta in power there in favor of forces from Russia’s Wagner mercenary group. Moscow’s penetration in the region was on show during Lavrov’s visit. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi gave him a warm welcome in Cairo, singling out Russian-owned Rosatom’s construction of Egypt’s first nuclear plant as a prime example of bilateral cooperation. | | | |
Biden, China’s Xi Talk as a Pelosi Trip to Taiwan Threatens to Inject New Tensions |
| | Chinese leader Xi Jinping warned President Biden about relations with Taiwan, as a possible trip to the island by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi adds tensions to strained relations. Mr Xi urged the US to tread cautiously in its ties there and heed Beijing’s interests over what it sees as a matter of sovereignty. For Beijing, a trip by a politician as senior as Mrs. Pelosi is seen as part of a perilous backtracking by the U.S. on commitments limiting its relations with Taiwan. The Biden administration, in turn, has said it is abiding by those previous agreements, as well as a U.S. law requiring it to provide weapons for Taiwan’s defense. | | | |
Russia Is Gaining an Indo-Pacific Foothold Through Myanmar |
| | Earlier this month, the leader of Myanmar’s ruling military junta, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, went to Russia in order to expand his regime’s defense and energy cooperation with Moscow. The relationship is most definitely lopsided and Moscow has not been willing to publicly embrace Min Aung Hlaing’s regime just yet. During his visit last week, the general was not granted a meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, and Russia downplayed the visit as a “private” one. Yet, since the coup last February, Russia has been using its military might to expand its influence in Myanmar by sponsoring the junta’s operations. | | | |
How Bad Will the Global Food Crisis Get? |
| | Food commodity prices are falling, but experts say global production and hunger rates might be even worse in 2023. So far, the main concern about food has been grain supplies, especially the wheat and vegetable oils of which Ukraine is a large exporter. But some analysts are concerned about the price of rice, the cornerstone of diets across Asia. Across much of Africa, the Middle East and central Asia, consumption of staples outweighs production. It is countries in these regions that are most exposed to global price rises. | | | |
The Resilience Myth: Fatal Flaws in the Push to Secure Chip Supply Chains |
| | Amid US-China trade tensions and pandemic disruptions, governments in China, the US, Europe and elsewhere have determined to "onshore" semiconductor manufacturing. So-called supply chain resilience has become a central aim of policy. But such resilience is a myth. These new national efforts are backed by huge subsidies and state-backed investments. The trouble is these efforts touch only the visible end of the semiconductor supply chain. Behind chip production sits a network supplying equipment and other items encompassing hundreds of raw materials, chemicals, consumable parts, gases and metals without which the bogglingly precise process of chipmaking could not function. | | | |
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